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In discussions on migration a basic distinction is often made between ‘voluntary’ and 
‘forced’ migrants. Economic migrants are frequently assumed to be people ‘choosing’ 
to improve their situation, while forced migrants are constructed as victims of 
‘political’ persecution. This distinction underpins migration policy where the two 
categories (voluntary economic vs forced political) are treated as separate and 
mutually exclusive categories. However according to the UNHCR: 
 
[Migrants travel] together generally in an irregular manner, using the 
same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. Persons 
travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles 
and may include asylum-seekers, refugees, trafficked persons, 
unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular 
situation. (UNHCR 2011) 
 
The concentration on stemming the flow of irregular migrants (and the distinction 
between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’) is hugely problematic (Handmaker and Mora 2014), 
not least when ‘regular’ routes are so scarce. However, migration is in many senses 
mixed, and at all stages of the migration process, not just on the journey. Migration 
motivations may be mixed, as those who flee conflict, human rights abuses and 
persecution will also be leaving economic instability and poverty: they will want not 
merely to save their lives, but to make a living once they arrive in a place of safety. 
Similarly, those who come in search of employment may be excluded from work or 
education in their country of origin because of their gender, religion or ethnicity. 
Those who leave looking for work may be forced to move again because of 
discrimination.  In the countries where people settle, those who arrive as refugees will 
join labour migrants in the competition for accommodation, education and 
employment.  
 
All of this makes it difficult to distinguish neatly between migrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees, a reality increasingly accepted by migration and asylum experts. Yet 
there is continued insistence that such a distinction is necessary. Refugee advocates 
are committed to ‘disentangling refugees to ensure their proper protection’ (UNHCR 
2011), while states argue that ‘the principle of asylum is better defended when access 
to it is restricted’ (Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012), though their concern is clearly with 
controlling migration and ensuring that asylum does not become an open gateway for 
all.  
 
6.2.2 Why is it necessary to distinguish between refugees and migrants? 
 
The issue arises because in the twentieth century, developed states formalised a 
commitment to protect refugees: not all refugees, just those who meet the criteria 
specified in Art.1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and who either manage to reach the territory of European states or who have been 
selected from refugee camps in Indonesia, Iran, Kenya or Pakistan to fill the quotas of 
a small number of developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, the US and a 
handful of EU member states.1  
 
Overwhelmingly, the states who host the largest refugee populations (Pakistan 
1,616,000, Iran 857,000, Lebanon 856,000, Jordan 642,000, Turkey 610,000, Kenya 
535,000, Chad and Ethiopia 434,000 each [European Commission Migration and 
Home Affairs 2014]) are those who do not have the kind of highly bureaucratic 
individual processing of asylum claims seen in Europe, North America or Australia.2 
Refugees account for about seven per cent (16.7 million) of the global migrant 
                         
1
 While 27 countries (out of 194) do resettle individuals, this is from camps in neighbouring countries 
(there are approximately 80,000 places available each year and 950,000 needed with the numbers 
increasing every year). 
2Three out of the top four refugee hosting states (Jordan, Lebanon and Pakistan) are not even 
signatories of the 1951 Convention. These states have also produced significant numbers of refugees at 
different periods of time. 
population (232 million) and the overwhelming majority (86 per cent) of them find 
refuge in developing countries. However, the majority of asylum seekers (those 
awaiting formal recognition by states of their refugee status) are found in the 
developed world (almost 50 per cent in the EU [Ibid.]) where states use asylum 
procedures to identify a small number of refugees, insisting that the majority of 
applicants are trying to use asylum to enter the EU illegally to work and or profit from 
Europe’s welfare provisions. 
 
Because developed states in particular have constructed a subset of refugees as a 
group of migrants to whom special duties are owed, asylum systems in developed 
countries are designed to sift out refugees from the general migrant population and a 
key tool is the Art. 1 definition, which is very narrow. It excludes the vast majority of 
refugees in the world, and is confined to those who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group 
and political opinion. These persons must also be unable or unwilling to avail 
themselves of the protection of their state of habitual residence and be outside the 
territory of that state. Nonetheless, there is just enough flexibility that where there is 
political will, it can be extended to cover quite a range of social groups (divorced 
women in Pakistan, homosexuals from Jamaica or Uganda, Afghans fleeing blood 
feuds or forced marriage) (Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012).  
 
6.2.3 Mixed migration debates 
 
While policy-makers and migration analysts insist the distinction between those who 
chose to move and those who are forced to, that is, between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ 
migrants, is necessary in order to protect the latter, academics and analysts have long 
argued that it is more useful to think of migration as occurring along a continuum: 
… at one end of which individuals and collectivities are proactive and at the other 
reactive. Under certain conditions, the decision to move may be made after due 
consideration of all relevant information, rationally calculated to maximise net 
advantage, including both material and symbolic rewards. At the other extreme, the 
decision to move may be made in a state of panic during a crisis that leaves few 
alternatives but escape from intolerable threats. (Richmond 1994, p. 55) 
It is likely that most migrants lie somewhere between these two extremes, exercising 
some choice within certain economic, political, social, or structural constraints over 
which they have little control (Van Hear 2009, pp. 3-4). Although, even ‘in a state of 
panic’, forced migrants still exercise a degree of agency (not everyone has left Syria – 
some went to Jordan, while others ‘chose’ Lebanon or Turkey, or to cross the 
Mediterranean) (Castles 2003; Turton 2003). Other scholars have explored the 
structural factors forcing some people abroad to seek employment in conditions akin 
to slavery (Strauss 2013; Skeldon 2011) where it is difficult to argue they ‘chose’ to 
migrate for the conditions under which they work.  
 
There is now an extensive body of empirical studies of these complex migration 
patterns, of which Monsutti’s (2005) study of Afghan migrants offers a paradigmatic 
case. Afghanistan is the source country for the largest group of refugees in the world 
(though it is now being rivalled by Syria), most of whom are settled, however 
precariously in Iran or Pakistan. Many have been present there for decades and 
constitute an important part of those countries’ labour force. It is interesting to note 
that almost as many are ‘irregular migrants’ as are registered refugees, and many have 
shifted back and forth between these statuses. In spite of the fall of the Taliban, 
Afghans continue migrate pushed by continued conflict, political instability and high 
unemployment at home, discrimination in employment and education in Iran, and 
violent attacks in Pakistan. Increasing numbers are heading to Australia, Europe or 
the Gulf States, usually as undocumented migrants. Those who survive the journeys 
across land and sea borders will achieve at least a temporary legal status as asylum 
seekers, while the majority of those who arrive in the Gulf States will end up as 
undocumented workers. So Afghans may be moving because they are persecuted and 
their government cannot protect them or because there is no work or both; they will 
travel predominantly as irregular migrants, may become ‘legal’ when they apply for 
asylum, before either being recognised as refugees or rejected as ‘economic 
migrants’.  
 
Scheel and Ratfisch (2014) note that the insistence on neat categories serves to 
legitimise some migrants (refugee victims) and de-legitimise others (villainous illegal 
migrants), as Refugee Status Determination procedures (RSD) also legitimise the 
measures taken against the latter. By insisting on the distinction, however, policy 
makers not only fail to protect the 1951 Convention refugees, the majority of refugees 
who are fleeing conflict and human rights abuses, or are forced to leave for a mixture 
of reasons, but also actively endanger them by forcing them into the hands of 
smugglers. 
 
6.2.4 Policy debates 
 
The narrow understanding of ‘mixed migration’ took root in the 1990s, particularly 
during the Yugoslav war, as policy-makers and the public became convinced that 
‘economic migrants’ were pretending to be refugees in order to evade migration 
controls, even though, then as now, most of the applications were coming from 
countries in conflict and only a minority of refugees would make it to developed 
states (Castles, Crawley and Loughna 2002). As increasing numbers of dead bodies 
washed up on the shores of the Mediterranean, many of whom were coming from 
refugee-producing countries, UNHCR/ILO explored the ‘Asylum-Migration Nexus’ 
(2001), This nexus illustratedthe reality that those seeking asylum were travelling the 
same routes as those seeking employment and avoiding migration controls. It was 
argued that while the flows were definitely mixed, it seemed more likely that many of 
those who sought work in neighbouring or distant countries were in fact refugees but 
chose not to apply for asylum because of suspicions that were directed at refugees, or 
because asylum seekers would not be allowed to work or might be detained in camps 
(UNHCR/ILO 2001, p. 2).  
 
In the same section, it further noted that once refugees were recognised as such, or 
given some protection status and authorisation to work, they faced the same 
challenges as other migrants such as: 
  
access to employment, of decent work conditions when employed, of 
protection of labour rights, etc. It is clear from recent research that refugees 
frequently face similar treatment as, and are not significantly differentiated 
from, other migrants and immigrants in labour and administrative law, by 
employers, and by the public at large. (UNHCR/ILO 2001, p. 2) 
 
And yet, multilateral agencies such as UNHCR, under pressure from donor states, 
accepted that the asylum gateway was being abused by ‘bogus refugees’. There was 
concern that the backlash this was provoking was undermining protection for 
‘genuine refugees’ as EU member states strengthened external border controls and 
sought to externalise the sifting process to transit countries, particularly in North 
Africa (Noll 2003; Schuster 2005). Member states argued that examining claims 
closer to countries of origin would remove the need for refugees to risk their lives 
attempting to reach Europe, for example. A consensus took hold among policy-
makers in the developed countries that what was required was more and better 
management (control) of migration, but that ‘managed migration systems should … 
be based on a clear distinction between the different categories of persons’ (UNGA 
2003, p. 11).  
 
This focus on mixed flows of conceptually distinct groups of people culminated in 
2006 in the launch of an Agenda for Protection and The Refugee Protection and 
Mixed Migration:10 Point Action Plan by UNHCR (revised in 2007 and 2011). These 
protocols were designed to ensure the protection needs of refugees would be met and 
that states would fulfil the responsibilities they had assumed under international 
instruments. The Agenda’s second goal was ‘to protect refugees within broader 
migration movements’. However, the Plan focused largely on improving cooperation 
and information sharing between states and multilateral agencies, and information 
campaigns to dissuade people, including asylum seekers, from irregular migration 
without offering any alternative either for labour migrants or for asylum seekers.  
 
There were a number of measures designed to relieve the burden on states of mixed 
migration flows, with ‘large’ (see above) numbers of people arriving, most of whom 
were presumed to be fraudulent. These measures were also designed to assess 
admissibility (whether an asylum seeker’s claim should be examined or the person 
sent to another country), and accelerate procedures, which would allow those whose 
claims were ‘manifestly unfounded’ to be rejected at ports or as soon as possible 
thereafter. The ten point plan clearly reflects the priorities of UNHCR and its partner 
states, which were to ensure that:  
 
the provision of protection and asylum to refugees and other people of concern 
to the Office does not compound the difficulties that states experience in 
controlling more generally the arrival and residence of foreign nationals and in 
combating international crime. (UNHCR 2007) 
 
There was (is) no plan to address the complex situations that cause people to move, to 
create safe routes for refugees to leave those countries in which they are in danger or 
to resettle those stuck in camps for many years. Instead, the emphasis has been on 
preventing arrivals, especially into Europe. Since the mid-1990s, European states 
have used visas to block entry through air- and seaports and introduced a range of 
border control measures including the Spanish Sistema de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE) 
and razor-wire fences around the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla; Italian naval 
blockades and push-backs to Libya; and the demining of the Greek Evros region and 
erection of a high-tech fence in 2013. At the EU level the border agency, Frontex, 
coordinates operations to combat smuggling and trafficking and to prevent irregular 
migration by sea, intercepting boats believed to be carrying irregular migrants, and 
along the EU’s external land borders. Following the drowning of 360 migrants off the 
island of Lampedusa in October 2013, the entire Mediterranean is now monitored by 
Eurosur, an integrated surveillance and intelligence system.  
 
All of these measures have made it much more difficult for migrants, including 
refugees, to reach Europe, driving them into ‘the hands of smugglers, feeding an 
unscrupulous trade that threatens the lives of desperate people’ (IOM 2014, p. 5). As a 
result, the number of people dying as they cross the Mediterranean has increased 
significantly in the last 15 years. 
 
Table 6.2.1 Border Deaths in the Mediterranean (2 different sources) 
 Source: IOM 2014, p. 93. (UNITED for Intercultural Action and Fortress Europe both monitor 




In summary, while scholars insist that migration is mixed at all stages of the migration 
process, policy-makers and multilateral agencies such as UNHCR continue to insist, 
contrary to the evidence, that ‘Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to 
move in order to improve their lives. Refugees are forced to flee to save their lives or 
preserve their freedom’ (UNHCR 2013). The attempt by some states to separate out a 
small group of people that they wish to protect, while seeking to prevent the entry of 
the majority they deem not to be in need of protection, is counter-productive. It 
increases the risks run by all migrants including those they purport to protect, and has 
contributed to the spike in deaths seen in Table 6.2.1 above.  
 
 
Far better would be to acknowledge the complexity of migration flows, and to 
acknowledge the costs (financial and human) of the attempts to disentangle refugees 
from other kinds of migrants. Given that economic, political and social pressures to 
migrate are likely to be exacerbated by environmental factors, is to be hoped that long 
before the centenary for the 1951 Convention, human mobility for what ever reason 
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